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Innovations and Trends In Pension Plan Coverage,
Pension Type and Plan Design
Introduction
Business and labor market developments over the last two decades, and the
expectation of continued changes, offer new challenges to the form and structure of
employer-sponsored pension plans. Worklives are becoming more varied and shorter,
sp~nning multiple employers and careers, and reaching retirement at an earlier age than ever
before. Business conditions have also undergone tremendous change during the last decade,
as witnessed by the decline of traditional large manufacturers (e.g. steel, auto, electronics and
heavy equip,ment) and the transition to smaller firms in an information and service-based
economy, changes in business ownership and corporate restructuring, the escalation of
international competition, changes in corporate and individual taxation, and a decline in
unionization.
In this paper, we outline recent trends in employer pension plan structure in the
United States, focusing on plan coverage, plan type and pension plan design. We then
identify the key factors that we believe will shape company-sponsored pension design in the
future, drawing conclusions from reviewing recent research and practice. Finally, we offer a
cautious prognosis about the future of pension plan coverage and design, focusing on the role
of labor force aging, as well as anticipated developments in the business environment and
anticipated changes in public policy.
Recent Trends in Pension Plan Coverage, Type and
Design
Pension Plans Have Many Functions
Pensions have many economic and other functions responding to. employee needs and
plan sponsor objectives. Perhaps, the most important reason employees want pensions is to
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help them save for retirement. thus reducing old-age economic insecurity. A companion role
of pensions is to provide annUities, since outliving one's savings is for many a major source of
economic insecurity in the last third of life. Many pensions, particularly defined benefit
plans, offer insurance against extended longevity by promising an annuity payment from
retirement to death. Employer-sponsored pensions cost less than individually-purchased
retirement annuities, in part, because there is no adverse selection by the purchaser.
In addition, workers want pensions because dollars saved in a pension plan generate
more retirement benefits by virtue of economies of scale and risk POQlin&.Larger investment
pools can be shown to save substantially on arlministrative costs and investment expenses
when they are compared to individually-purchased annuities.
Another central reason that people seek to save for retirement using pensions rests in
U.S. taX law. In the United States, employees are permitted to pay lower current taxes when
a portion of employee compensation is deposited in a pension plan, rather than being paid in
cash. The opportunity to save on a pre-tax basis has been shown to be a tax-effective form
of compensation, particularly for people in higher marginal tax brackets. (For evidence on
each of these points, see Gustman and Mitchell, forthcoming 1992, and Gus1man, Mitchell
and Steinmeier, forthcoming 1992.)
Unions have also played an important role in shaping the pension environment, by
bargaining for and influencing plan type, benefit levels and plan design. Negotiated plans
were preeminently defined benefit plans, typically with relatively generous benefit levels and
multiple options for early retirement Historically, these plans also set the standard for
nonunion companies, but this pattern has rlimini"hed as the unionized fraction of the
workforce declined over the last decade. (Unique features of union plans are discussed in
Gustman, Mitchell and Steinmeier, forthcoming 1992.)
Employers institute pension plans for a variety of reasons, but their overall goal is
generally thought to be to design compensation patterns consistent with their human resource
~. Human resource policies, in turn, are driven by companybusiness strategy. Some
organizations, particularly larger ones, tend to emphasize selection, retention and motivation
of the "right" employees as central to their business success. This perspective is seen in
recent efforts to implement "total quality management" efforts in the U.S., and implies
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long-term worker/company attachments as well as pension pIan design which favors this
practice.
Consistent with this notion is the view that pensions are frequently offered to attract
and keep va1uable workers. In part, this is achieved by pension plan features which
encourage effort and discourage worker mo~. For example, vesting rules tend to
discourage workers from changing jobs before gaining a legal right to a pension benefit,
whicb is frequently attained after five years of service. Benefit accrual formulas, particularly
in defined benefit plans, can reduce turnover and increase effort. by offering, in effect, higher
compensation to those employees who stay longer and whose pay rises with seniority.
Another aspect of pensions which employers find useful is that they are perceived as
attracting and retaiDinf certain kinds of workers over others. Thus, some businesses find it
essential to attract workers who will remain with the firm for a long period of time. This can
be important when, for instance, the workforce bas a great deal of firm-specific traming and
knowledge which is not easily duplicated. Because pensions are a form of deferred
compensation, only those workers who intend to remain at the company will tend to be
attracted to pension-covered jobs. Thus, the pension itself tends to be a recruitment and
retention tool for workers with desired characteristi~ In still other cases, pensions which
reward workers based on company profitability generate the incentives for covered
~Qyees to more c~gn their work effort with comp~ oQjectives. as in the case of
profit sharing and stock ownership plans. (See Gustman, Mitchell and Steinmeier,
forthcoming 1992; and Ippolito, 1992).
Employers have also found pension plans to be belpful in other contexts, particularly
with regard to regulating retirement flows. When productivity begins to plateau, or when
technological cbange renders skills obsolete, a company's pension offerings can provide the
opportunity for career employees to leave the company with dignity and with adequate
income security. In some cases, companies have also used pensions, particularly early
retirement windows, to minimize involuntaIy terminations when faced with the need for
corporate restructuring and downsizing. (More discussion on these points appears in
Gustman et a1, forthcoming 1992; Luzadis and Mitchell, 1991; and Lazear, 1983.) The
pension plan can, therefore, be designed to make retirement appealing by making retirement
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benefits more generous overall, and by ma1dng early retirement benefits generous as
compared to pension payments for delayed retirement.
Differentiating Defined Benefit and Defined Contribution Plans
The two major types of pension plans in the United States are defined benefit (DB)
plans, and defined contribution (DC) plans. In the former case, the employer generally
specifies a formula for benefits defined as income and payable at retirement, whereas in the
latter case, the employer typically states a formula for plan contributions (often as a fraction
of pay) during an employee's working lifetime. DB plans are the predominant form of
employer-provided pension plan in the U.S., covering about 63 percent of employees of
medium and large employers and 20 percent of employees of small employers (those with
under 100 employees), and 93 percent of government employees as is shown in Tables 1 and
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DB plans are usually structured to achieve multiple outcomes (see Table 4):
. They meet employee needs for retirement income (often assumed to be the
maintenance of preretirement living standards).
They are associated with reducing worker turnover, encouraging career
employment and employee loyalty, thereby protecting the employer's
investment in human capital.
They help career employees leave the labor force with dignity at a retirement
age which fits the employer's human resource policy.
They support other human resources needs, including workforce down~i'T.ing,.
They meet competitive practices and conform to the general practices in the
community.
.
.
.
.
DC plans have some of the same features, but many different ones as well. In a DC
plan, the employer generally specifiescontributions into the pension plan rather than formula
defined benefits, and the funds thus accumulated are invested until the worker reaches
retirement age. In a DB plan, the obligation is fixedby the benefit defined and the
application of minimum funding rules, but in a DC plan, the contribution can be defined or
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discretionary. Table 4 compares features of these plans. DC plans currently cover 48
percent of employees of medium and large employers and 31 percent of employees of small
employers, as well as 9 percent of employees of public employers. Some of these employees
are also covered by DB plans. Because DC plans are subject to the same tax-qualification .
rules as the DB plans, many of the same retirement savings goals can be met with these
plans. In addition, DC plans can meet other COIporate goals including:
. They encourage employees to save pre-tax for their own retirement, including
perhaps savings to meet the need for medica] care after retirement
Increasing worker motivation and giving workers a "stake" in the company,
particularly when contn'butions depend on company profitability, or when
pension assets are invested in company stock.
Helping the company finance itse1f in an effective manner.
Providing lump sum cashouts to workers who leave the firm before reaching
retirement age.
.
.
Employees also seem to understand and appreciate DC plans more than DB plans, which
may explain their recent growth. This may be because plan sponsors offer periodic
statements of account balances in DC plans, whereas this concept is not applicable in the DB
case, where statements are usually less frequent, and generally show accrued and projected
retirement income rather than a lump sum account balance. (A few DB plans are designed
for lump sum payouts, however.) In addition, DC account balances are often portable from
one job to the next, whereas a DB annuity payment beginning at age 55 or later seems
remote to young workers. Nevertheless, this apparent better understanding of DC plans is
probably somewhat illusory since employees cannot readily translate DC plan balances into
retirement income. In addition, DC portability does not ensure retirement security since the
pension balances are often spent rather than saved (Rappaport, Discussion of Biggs Paper,
forthcoming 1992.)
Evaluating the efficacy and usefulness of the two plan types requires one to recognize
that over the long run, a dollar invested in a DB plan often produces more investment
income than in a DC plan. This is because DB plan sponsors typically use a balanced
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portfolio to maximize investment returns consistent with their riskprofiles, but in DC plans
where employees have investment choices, they frequently invest in fixed income securities.
Thus "401(k) plan participants descn"bed themselves as conservative investors who prefer to
direct their own investments toward insurance and bank contracts... and said they were more
inclined to choose 10w-riskJlow return investments" (EBRI, 1992.) The different investment
mix can easily result in a 1 to 3 percent lower average return for a typica1 DC plans as
compared to a typica1 DB plan. Data on reported returns of DB and DC plans for the five-
year period ending in 1989 confirms that the DB plan investments outperformed those of DC
plans (See Table 5). These trends will probably continue because the fraction of DC plans
permitting individual direction in investment options has probably increased, while in DB
plans more aggressively m~n~fed portfolios became more popular over time.
Of course, DC plans are quite varied in form, and differ among themselves with
regard to whether and what investment choices are available. Some plans offer only
investments in company stock, whereas others offer a choice between different investment
portfolios. 'When a DC plan is wholly invested in company stock, as in the case of an
employee stock ownership (ESOP) plan, there is substantially higher investment risk in the
DC plan, and a higher expected average investment return. Nevertheless, stock ownership
plans have grown over time, covering 11 million employees as of 1989 (see Table 6).
Another difference between DB and DC plans which has gotten increasing attention
in recent years, is the fact that DB plans typically provide monthly income, whereas DC plans
typically pay lump sums. H early lump sum payments are spent rather than saved, this brings
into question the tax-favored status of such plans. Those concerned about retirement security
bave proposed outlawing these lump sum cashouts, or favor higher penalties if cashouts are
not transferred to another retirement savings plan; on the other band, the a~ability of lump
sum cashouts can make it easier for companies to downsize if tax law remains relatively
favorable toward pension lump sums.
Typical Pension Plan Structures by Type of Employer
Pension plan features differ greatly across employer size and type of plan sponsor. In
order to illustrate the rich variety of benefit practices currently in effect, it is useful to review
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and compare data on pension plans covering employees of large and small private-sector
firms, multi-employer groups, not-for-profit organizations and public sector employee groups.
Medium and Large-sized Fmployer P1Ilns
Data for pension plans offered by private establishments with 100 or more employees were
last collected in a 1989 Employee Benefit Smvey conducted by the U.S. Department of
Labor (USDO~ 1990). This evidence (see Table 1) shows that nearly an medium and large
employers sponsored pension plans: 81% of employees were covered by retirement p~
with 63% covered by DB plans and 48% by DC plans (some employees bave both). Most
DB plans also structured formulas to replace generous percentages of earnings:
three-quarters based benefits primarily on earnings, especially earnings during the final years
of employment with the plan sponsor so as to protect benefits against inflation (prior to
retirement). Average replacement rates in the DB plans were about 1% for each year of
service. Therefore, a typical worker with 20 years of service at retirement might expect a
benefit worth 20 percent of final average earnings, while the 3O-year of service retiree would
anticipate a replacement rate closer to 30 percent (USDOL 1989, T.SS). Determini11£
whether these benefits meet income adequacy standards must take into account Social
Security and personal funds, and the extent to which benefits are indexed after inflation.
Medium and large employers have, for many years, offered a measure of inflation protection
for retirement inasmuch as 41 percent of their employees had retiree health coverage prior
to age 65, and 36 percent had retiree health coverage post-65 in 1989. On the other hand,
inflation protection after retirement is not complete, and appears to have declined in the last
decade which suggests that inflation remains a challenge to pension retirement income
adequacy (Allen, Oark and McDermed, 1991; Gustman and Steinmeier, 1987.)
In the very largest companies, a typical pension program included a first-tier
non-contributory DB plan with a second tier which was often a matched savings plan of the
DC variety. In the past, most larger employers also tended to offer retiree health insurance
along with the pension, but the future is uncertain as health care costs continue to rise.
Some employers offered profit sharing for salaried workers, and a DB plan for hourly
employees. Relatively few employers adopted stock ownership plans as primary retirement
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vehicles though many use them to supplement basicretirement programs. Medium-sized
employers were more likely to use DC plans frequently with a cash Qump-sum) retirement
benefit. Here, too, retiree health benefit plans were less prevalent.
SmaIl Employer PIons
Pension data for private establishments with fewer than 100 employees were last collected in
a 1990 Employee Benefit Swvey (USOOl., 1990). A review of coverage and benefit patterns
indicates that small employers are much less likely than large employers to offer retirement
benefits, and where plans are offered, they tend to be DC plans (see Table 1). Thus, 42
percent of employees in small companies were covered by retirement plans based on the last
published swvey data, including 20 percent with DB plans and 41 percent having DC plans
(some employees have both). These employers were a1so less likely to offer retiree health
insurance coverage: only 13 percent of these employees have retiree health coverage. While
data on benefit leveIs for small employers have not yet been published, they are probably
lower than those reported above for medium and large employers. This conclusion is
suggested by other studies which have found that small companies offer lower compensation
levels in general (Brown and Medoff, 1989).
MulJi-emplayer PlaN;
Multi-employer pension plans incorporate workers from a number of different employers,
and are commonly found in the unionized trucking, construction, and retail trade sectors. In
the past, they were used to provide private retirement benefits to workers employed in a
trade who frequently worked for different employers over relatively short periods. Most
multi-employer plans permit workers to cany their coverage with them from one job to the
next, so long as they remain in covered employment (usually in the same occupation or
industry, as a member of the same union). For historical reasons, these pensions face
different economic constraints and regulatory obligations than those affecting single employer
plans (Luzadis and Mitcbell, 1991; Mitchell and Andrews 1981).
These plans bave not grown much over time - there are only about three thousand
plans currently in existence (see Table 3), and multi-employer plans constitute less than one-.
10
.,.
half of one percent of total private plans (see Table 3). They are likely to shrink in the
future because of the continued fall in private sector union membership, and projected
declines in industries which traditionally used multi~mployer plans. In addition, many
employers have grown concerned about the financial solvency of these DB pensions with
continued increases in negotiated flat~o11ar benefit levels; many plans are underfunded and
employers joining the plans face potentially high withdrawa1liabilities. While these issues are
beyond the scope of the present paper which focuses primarily on single employer plans,
policymakers concerned with retirement security must also consider multi~mployer pIan
issues (USGAO, 1992).
Pension PIons in Not-For-Profit Fums
Not-for-profit organizations are a diverse group including membership associations, charities,
universities, religious orders, and health care providers. Their diversity also nnplies pension
plans with divergent structures and~. Thus, for instance, universities often offer faculty a
DC plan frequently funded by individual annuity contracts under the teachers' portable
nationwide plan. In contrast, the human resource concerns of health care providers and
larger membership associations resemble those of for-profit employers, and their pension
plans are more similar to those of their for-profit counterparts. Larger not-for-profit
employers offer pension benefit plans that are similar in structure to those of private
employers, except that their DC pensions are subject to substantially different regulations.
Religious orders can set up plans under the Church Plan rules which are considerably
different from general qualified plan rules. Smaller not-for-profits rely heavily on
tax-sheltered annuities under special sections of the tax code. Relatively few not-for-profits
offer retiree health.
Pension Plans in the Public Sedor
Human resource concerns of public sector employers frequently differ from those in the
private sector, partly because of civil service requirements and because more workers are
unionized in governmental entities. Also, pension regulation which covers private sector
11
plans does not typically govern plans of federal, state and local workers so that benefit plans
have some special chaTacteristics not found in the private sector.
Data on public sector plans is drawn from a 1987 Benefits Survey on full-time state
and local government employees in groups with 50 or more participants (USDOl, 1987).
Table 2 shows that pension coverage was more common than among private sector workers,
with 98 percent of state and toca1 employees having a retirement plan, inc1uding 93 percent
covered by a DB plan and 9 percent by a DC plan (some employees had both). Of course,
many public sector workers were traditionally exc1uded from Social Security so higher
coverage rates are not directly comparable with private sector figures. Public sector plans
also tend to offer generous retirement income: they facilitate earlier retirement, they tend to
offer postretirement indexation of benefits, and 48% of all covered public sector workers
have retiree health coverage (USDOl, 1987). 'JYpica1replacement rates for regular retirees
(exc1uding Social Security benefits) amounted to about 35 percent of final pay for a worker
with 20 years of service, and more than 50 percent for a retiree with 30 years of service
(USDOl, 1987). Public sector plans are much more likely to require employee
contributions than private sector plans.
Many problems and issues face governmental plans, inc1uding the fact that many plans
are quite underfunded (Mitchell and Smith, forthcoming 1992). Unfortunately, data on
public plans are much more difficult to obtain than in the private sector because public plans
are not required to conform to common reporting and disclosure requirements. While our
focus in this paper is primarily on private sector pension concerns, additional work is needed
to explore public sector pension issues. Specifically, it will be important to ascertain whether
public sector employees' retirement needs differ greatly from those in the private sector;
whether public employers' objectives, resources and constraints differ greatly from those in
-
the private sector; and whether pensions playa different economic role in the public and
private sector.
Recent Trends in the Mix of Defined Benefit and Defined Contribution
Plans:
There has been much written about the apparent decline in private sector DB pension
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coverage in recent years, and a concomitant increase in DC pIan coverage (Society of
Actuaries, 1990). These trends are illustrated in Table 3 which shows the number of DB and
DC plans over time, and the number of determination letter applications for new plans as
well as for plan terminations. The figures confirm that there was an increase in DC plans
relative to the number of DB plans: DB plans decreased from 32 percent of the total plan
universe in 1975, to 27 percent in 1987.
The leading explanation for this trend is that the industrial composition of
employment changed over the last fifteen to twenty years in ways which favored a shift to DC
pensions. Sectors which traditionally favored DB plans (e.g. durable manufacturing,
unionized companies) contracted, while the service and finance sectors grew - and the latter
have traditionally had DC plans. There are a1s0 mixed signals in the data, however. Only
about half of the overall movement toward DC plans has been linked to these national
employment shifts, and the shift was concentrated among smaller businesses (with between
100 and 1,000 participants), but there was no similar trend among very large companies (with
1,000 employees or more). (See PBGC, 1990; Oark and McDermed, 1990; Gustman and
Steinmeier, 1987).
A companion explanation for the downward drift in DB coverage is that DB plans
became increasingly expensive to administer over the last decade, especially compared to DC
alternatives. Note, however, that for many larger plans, this higher arlmini"trative cost has
been more than offset by reduced contributions due to favorable investment returns.
Numerous legislative and accounting changes during the 1980s increased the relative
complexity of m~maging DB plans, as compared to DC plans. Indeed, one study reported
that DB pension plan admini"trative costs almost tripled for small plans (15 participants)
between 1981 and 1991, while small employers' costs for DC 401(k) plans were far lower.
(See Hay-Huggins, 1990; Dark and McDermed, 1990).
Whether this administrative cost advantage of DC plans will persist in the future is
open to question. Several recent regulations and litigation may challenge the current
perception that DC plans are less costly to administer. For instance, troubles in the
insurance and financial industries highlighted responsibilities of plan sponsors to carefully
select and then monitor investment managers. Another issue is that a host of increasingly
13:
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complex and stringent nondiscrimination tests must be applied to plans permitting employee
contnDutions and/or employer matchinf funds which make DC plans more costly than in the
past. (This has been a primaIy area of focus in discussions about pension simplification.)
Reforms are also being proposed to clarify the status of a worker's DC pension plan status in
personal bankruptcy. This legislation will probably prevent an increase in the cost of
anmini~tering such plans as courts today are increasingly looking to DC pension plan assets
in bankruptcy. Last, but not least, regulations from the U.S. Department of Labor are
promoting more employee choice with regard to investments, increasing the complexity of
plan management and communication to employees.
On the other hand, insurance companies, banks and other financial intermediaries
continue to offer packaged "pension products" for smaller employers which are typically DC
plans. These products enable a small employer to use the package without requiring custom
design or much management A decade ago, "off the shelf' DB plan products were also sold,
and are now a rarity because of the regulatory complexity of operating DB pension plans.
Innovations In Defined Benefit Pension Plan Design
During the last decade, two factors strongly influenced the structure and design of DB
pension plans: regulation regarding specific plan features, and regulation regarding plan
termination. In both cases, Congress has enacted legislation, which with the implementing
regulations, will result in major change from past practice. As of early 1992, many of these
changes have not yet been fully implemented. For instance, major changes in pension law
were contained in the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (IRA), most of which became effective in
1989. Interpretations of the 'IRA along with additional regulations were not, however, issued
in final form until September, 1991, when a 600-page package of "Final Regulations" was
issued, effective for 1992 plan years. Subsequently, in February 1992, the U.S. Treasury
agreed to delay the effective date of many regulations until 1993 plan years; and for the tax
exempt sector and governmental plans, the effective date is now plan years befJnning in
1995. During the interim, 'IRA remained in effect, and employers were required to meet a
standard of good faith compliance. Therefore, much regulatory policy is still undergoing
change, and many plans are awaiting revisions. The uncertainty wrought by this continuous
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change is certainly depressing new plan formation and plan updating and may be hastening
pIan termination.
Despite the state of flux in which pension regulation finds itse~ a few common
themes are likely to be persistent. Throughout much of the 1980's, Congress became
progressively more interested in limiting access to tax~ed pension savings, unless the
plans could be shown to balance benefits to higher-paid employees with reIative1y generous
benefits to lower-paid employees. For instance, 'IRA requirement restricted annual
compensation for qualified pIan purposes to $200,000. The maximum benefit limits
permitted under Section 415 of the Intema1 Revenue Code were reduced three times during
the 1980s. 1RA also limited the extent to which employers can coordinate pension payments
and workers' Social Security benefits. These new limits on so-caIIed Social Security
integration required major changes in some very large plans, while at the same time,
significantly:complicating pIan arlminh.tration for those seeking maximum integration. As a
result of eliminating or reducing integration, pension benefits rise for the lower paid, and/or
are reduced for higher-paid employees. While equalization of benefits could increase
retirement income security for the lower-paid employees, it did limit employers' ability to
reward higher-paid employees with tax~ed pension benefits, and in some cases, it
resulted in an overall decrease in benefit amounts.
Pension plan sponsors have sought innovative approaches to these restrictions. One
has been to establish "non-qualified" pension plans for key executives. Here, highly
compensated employees who cannot be fully covered in a company's qualified plans because
of legal restrictions, are offered a pension pIan whose contnoutions are subject to tax (just as
cash compensation would be) once there is constructive receipt. In other cases, a
non-qualified plan may be offered to an executive hired in mid-career; here the plan grants,
in effect, additional service. Unfortunately, no nationally repreSentative data are available on
the incidence and structure of these plans.
The increasing complexity of nondiscrimination regulations has also produced
ever-more complicated pension plan arlmini"tration problems, and makes it challenging for
employees to understand their plans. Many plans have multiple layers of benefit formula
with different formulas applying to different years of service. Plan sponsors have called for
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simplification of pension regulation which is a popuIar politica1 slogan, but has yet to be
translated into legislation that Congress can agree on. Plan sponsors have criticized many of
these simplification proposals as not having gone far enough.
A different solution for some employers has been to terminate their DB pensions.
This phenomenon increased rapidly over the last decade: for instance, Table 3 indicates that
the number of DB termination applications increased from 4,000 in 1975 to 16,000 in 1989.
At the same time, applications for new plans plummeted. Nevertheless, the termination
trend cannot be blamed on regulation alone since many of these coincided with leveraged
buy-outs. In one study, for instance, 20 percent of the DB plans that had been sponsored by
bought-out companies were terminated after the IBO (USGAO, 1991). Most plans
terminated after lBOs were replaced, and most active participants were provided
replacement DB plans, suggesting that at least some of these terminations were primarily
financial transactions to remove surplus from the plans (Ippolito, 1989.)
In assessing the potential for future terminations of DB plans, it must be kept in mind
that legislation has made this step increasingly difficult and expensive over time. In addition,
taxation of pension plan reversions has increased, so that using pension surpluses to help
finance takeovers will probably decline in importance in the future (Ippolito, 1989.) Finally,
many small and medium employers a1ready terminated their DB plans during the 1980's so
this is largely a closed issue. To the extent that terminations are seen, they will be more ..
likely to coincide with company bankruptcy, or changes in direction for overall benefit
management pwposes, rather than to playa key role in company buyouts as seen during the
1980's.
In addition to plan termination and regulation, several other important developments
emerged over the last decade in the DB arena. An interesting one for human resource
analysts has been employers' increasing awareness of pensions as a human resources policy
tool, where DB pension offerings have been structured to help corporations downsize their
labor force. Sometimes, the traditional DB formula has included h'beral early retirement
offerings, and at other times, early retirement window arrangements are offered that provide
for additional retirement benefits for people retiring within a specified time. Early window
plans have become widespread among larger firms, as indicated by a recent report by
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Charles D. Spencer and Associates (1990) on early retirement incentives. This study showed
that 15 percent of 273 large employers queried had offered early retirement incentive
programs in 1989, and 24 percent had offered windows in 1986. Few, if any, employers
offered incentives annually, but many offered multiple incentives. Early retirement window
plans are attractive because they concentrate retirements during a shorter time period than
otherwise would be obtainable (l]}7~dis and Mitchell, 1991; Lumsdaine, Stock and WISe,
1990).
Along with early-out plans has come growing awareness that the retirement benefit
package also includes medica] benefits, and plan sponsors are increasingly facing the need to
link medica] and pension programs in designing coherent retirement offerings. On the other
hand, retiree health insurance costs are rising in tandem with active worker health insurance
costs, forcing careful m~nagement of total compensation, including tradeoff's between health
and pension offerings. Thus far, only anecdotal instances of this tradeoff can be cited, but it
is possible that retiree health insurance cost pressures may force more employers to revisit
the entire cost, structure, and contents of their retirement package offerings in the next few
years.
Another development in the DB arena is a trend toward new pension "designs",
including cash balance or account based pension plans. While these are fundamentally DB
plans which specify benefits as an account, they permit employers flexibility in converting to a
different type of benefit formula without undergoing plan termination. In such a plan,
benefits are defined according to a contribution formula, yet minimum benefit payouts (in
the form of life annuities) can be offered as in a traditional DB plan. The plan sponsor has
the option of later changing benefits and/or offering early retirement windows (Lumsdaine,
Stock and Wise, 1990.)
Admini~tratively, these plans require actuarial valuations and they are covered by
PBGC insurance (which may be seen as an advantage or disadvantage depending on one's
viewpoint). Thus far, relatively few employers offer them - 2 percent of the 1989 DB
participants in medium and large employers had account based plans, and 1 percent of the
1990 DB participants in small plans (DOL, 1989 and DOL, 1990). On the other hand, the
plans' legal status has recently been clarified: regulations issued at the end of 1991 clearly
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sanctioned these plans and provided a well-defined set of ruIes for passing nondiscrimination
tests. It is anticipated that these plans are likely to be very popular in years to come. There
has also been an increase in employers offering both DB and DC plans, and this trend too
will probably grow more prevalent among employers with DB plans.
Recent Developments in Defined ContributionPension Plan Design
The most significant DC plan development in the last decade was the growth of
401(k) plans. At the same time, regulation changes challenged admini~trators of DC plans in
some of the same ways detailed above. One key change was brought about by 'IRA rules
which tightened nondiscrimination tests. Many plans bad trouble meeting these tests, and
were forced to modify plans or reduce contn"butions for highly compensated employees.
Some employers have responded by h"bera1i7.ingtheir 401(k) plans, and increasing the amount
they "match", or contn"bute when an employee deposits money into the plan. Others have
turned to non-quaIified plans, to make up amounts which cannot be contn"buted into a
tax-qualified account due to the 1RA limits.
As in the case of companies offering DB pension plans, employers providing DC
plans have become increasingly aware of the need to coordinate pension and retiree medical
insurance offerings. There is growing interest in the use of DC plans as a vehicle to finance
retiree health benefits. Some benefits analysts and attorneys suggest that profit sharing plans
can be used to pre-fund retiree health insurance plans on a pre-tax basis. Some employers
have sought to provide funds for retiree health coverage with other benefit structures,
including stock ownership plans which permit retirees to elect to apply funds to cover retiree
health insurance. So far, few companies have adopted these programs, pending clarification
of these new arrangements' tax status.
Perhaps the most interesting development in the DC arena in the last decade is the
increased effort on the federal government's part to permit employees to make choices about
their pension funds, and to limit employees access to these funds prior to retirement
Response to restrictions on early witbdrawals is seen in plans' increased use of loan and
hardship withdrawal provisions, giving workers limited access to funds for non-retirement
purposes. Many DC plans aIso offer lump-sum cashouts if workers leave their employers.
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TI:Us is sometimes a cause of concern for those hoping to force workers to save more for
retirement, since available evidence suggests that workers spend, rather than save, the lump
sum cash amounts (Piascentini, 1990.)
In addition, there is growing concern about the implications of the way employees
make investment choices when they are permitted to do so with their retirement funds.
There is evidence to suggest that employees offered an investment choice tend to be
extremely risk averse, often putting 80 percent or more of their dollars in a fixed income
investment As a consequence, their investment returns often suffer. Low-return assets have
also proved to be riskier than expected in recent years, as "guaranteed" investments held by
insurance companies and banks have turned out to be worth less than expected. Fafiures at
Executive Ufe and Mutual Benefit Ufe have changed expectations drastically, placing new
concerns about fiduciary burdens on plan sponsors' shoulders, and creating new financial
worries for covered employees. The choice of investment options is probably more complex
than was generally perceived in the past, a troublesome development for small and
medium-sized employers who previously turned their plan management over to an insurance
company for investment m,maeement and administrative service.
The Coming Challenges To Company-Sponsored
Pensions
It appears unlikely that the nation will return to an era like that of the 19705 and
early 1980s, when pension coverage was growing and DB plans were the most
commonly-offered plan in both the private and public sectors (Kotlikoff and Smith, 1983.)
There are, however, several 'factors that suggest further growth of pensions, particularly in the
DC area, though many other influences will imply slower growth than over the last twenty
years. As we look to the next decade, several factors will pose challenges to
company-sponsored pensions. These include demographic trends, the business environment
and human resource policy, and public policy and federal regulation.
-
:
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Factors Influencing Employees' Desire For Pensions
A variety of demographic and economic factors in the years to come will influence
workers' desires for pensions, not all of them uniformly positively or negatively. One serious
challenge to the future of pensions arises from the stagnation in earnin~ experienced over
the last decade or two. Indeed, the average American worker's pay bas declined in real
terms in seven out of ten years during the 1980's (U.S. President, 1990). While part of this
stagnation in earnings may turn around as the economy moves toward recoveI)', it remains
the case that U.S. workers' earnings are not likely to rise quickly in the face of increasing
global competition.
Shrinking take-home pay leaves less for retirement savings, and implies that economic
recoveI)' is a neceS8aI)' ingredient for future pension growth. Related to this question, is
what will become of older workers' earnings as the baby boom ages? On the one hand, the
increased supply of older people could depress their earnings, thus reducing the capacity to
save for retirement On the other hand, a declining number of younger workers may induce
increased demand for older employees. Though future wage patterns are uncertain, forecasts
suggests that older workers' earnings will probably rise slightly as the baby boom ages
(Levine and Mitchell, 1988.) If true, this should somewhat offset the overall downward
pressure on pensions due to st8~~mt real earnings.
Another response to depressed earnings is increased work effort which, in fact, seems
to be happening already. After three decades of declining labor supply among men 55 years
old and over, there is now some suggestion that labor force participation rates have
stabilized and even begun to increase in the latter half of the 1980's (Quinn, Burkhauser and
Myers, 1990.) If this turnaround in retirement persists, older workers may need less pension
savings inasmuch as a shorter period will be spent out of the labor force.
The avng of the workforce is likely to increase the demand for retirement savings in
general, and for pensions in particular., As the baby boom ages, it will become increasingly
aware of retirement savings needs, and the tax-preferred status of pensions will continue to
make them more appealing than non-pension alternatives. The long-term trend toward
earlier retirement among males has also implied that retirement saving must be
accomplished in a shorter time (Fields and Mitchell, 1984), though women have continued to
20
-r-
enter the workforce in greater numbers even among the older age groups. Many of today's
workers also had their children later in life, leaving a relatively short time to save for
retirement after children complete their education. 1Wo-eamer families have increased
greatly in numbers in the last three decades, and it may be easier for them to devote income
to retirement pensions once the child-rearing demands are over. Among such couples, high
family mar~nal income and payro~ rates will also increase pension plans' appeal Last,
but not least, today's retirees have benefitted from higher-than-anticipated housing values
which future retirees will probably not approach. If baby boomers cannot count on housiD&
appreciation for much of retirement wealth, they will need to look to pensions more than the
previous generation.
Factors working in the opposite direction should a1so be considered, however. If
pension contributions and pension investment earnings lose all or part of their tax-protected
status, this Will surely reduce the tax-preferred role of pensions versus other forms of saving
(Woodbury and Huang, 1991). In addition, employment paths are changing in such a way as
to make pension coverage less valuable. Many Americans, particularly women, ~
between j~ and out of the labor force during much or all of their working lives. 1bis
implies that they tend not to vest even when pension coverage is available, or when they do
vest, they do not reap the rewards of a pension based on final average earnings.
Corporate downsizin~ has also cut short career jobs for many long-term employees,
meaning that they will not receive retirement benefits based on a full career with one
company. Analogously, many overfunded DB plans terminated during the 19808, a
phenomenon that provided annuities, or perhaps a lump sum, to covered workers based on a
partial, rather than a complete career. Even if an employee earns a vested benefit with
several employers, the sum of the vested benefits is usually less valuable than the benefit
earned for one continuous period of employment.
.
The prevalence of pensions may be tapering off because of declines in private sector
unionization: in 1983 the fraction of employed wage and salary workers represented by
unions was 23 percent, which dropped to 19 percent in 1989. Unions played a major role in
demanding pension plans, particularly DB plans through the 19708,but this has not been true
for the last decade and will probably not be true in the future. Additionally, more
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businesses are relying on contingent workers who are unlikely to have benefits of any type,
but particularly pensions (Belous, 1990.) Growth in the use of contingent workers will reduce
both DB and DC plan coverage.
Finally, workers are becoming increasingly concerned about health care insurance
both prior to and during retirement. Increasing health care cost mflation leaves fewer dollars
in the compensation pool for pay increases and other benefits including pensions. In some
cases, employees directly confront these tradeoffs as in flexible or "cafeteria" benefit plans
which require workers to allocate benefit credits between health and other benefit options.
In other cases, the pressure from health care costs is at retirement. Increasingly, it seems
workers' decisions about when to retire are being conditioned not only by their pensions, but
also by the health care insurance offerings they will have during retirement. Whether this
trade-off becomes increasingly acute will depend on efforts to control the national health
care costs and delivery, but this topic is beyond the scope of our paper.
Factors Influencing Employers' Willingness to Offer Pensions
In the past, employers offered pensions when they were profitable enough to pay
relatively high benefits along with wages. In addition, pension growth, particularly of the DB
plan variety, was fostered by employer desire to achieve lon,i-term employee attachment to
the company (Gustman and Mitchell, forthcoming 1992).
What changed during the 198057 In the private sector, especially in durable
manufacturing, global and local competition drove down wages as well as profits, and
leveraged buy-outs threatened business as usual. Increasing global competition, new
technology, and the long recession also induced widespread corporate downsizing and
brought shifts in the industrial composition of the U.S. economy. Firm size also played a
role: in the past, larger employers were typically those most likely to offer pensions, but
many of these were also the businesses most vulnerable to shrinkage over the last decade.
For these reasons, overall pension coverage leveled off and even declined slightly during the
19805 (Allen, Clark and McDermed, 1991; Gustman and Steinmeier, 1987; PBGC, 1990.)
These changes brought labor costs into the limelight in the 19805, a trend which will
continue to characterize the 19905. Particular attention is being devoted by employers to an
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evaluation of the benefits, and the costs of offering health care benefits for active employees
and retirees, as well as pensions. Many suggest that retirement benefit pIans look
increasingly expensive, particularly as hea1th care inflation exerts increased pressure on
employer labor costs. There is also no indication that hea1th care inflation rates will slow
down, forcing some companies in crisis to control other benefit costs and possl"blyto
terminate pension plans or freeze benefit accruals. Massive pIan termination is unlikely in
the future because pension regulation has made termination less attractive, both where plans
are overfunded, and where pIans are underfunded, but where the pIan sponsors have assets
to cover liabilities. However, there remains the danger of underfunded pension pIan
termination when businesses are in severe financial trouble.
Lest our description of these trends be misinteIpreted, we must state that many
employers will continue to want and need pensions (and retiree health benefits) in their
compensation packages. DB plans remain a very important tool in human resources
management for employers who wish.to promote long-term career employment, and are
.
necessary tools for reduclni turnover among middle-aged workers, and for faciIitatini
subsequent retirement In the business restructuring of the last few years, early retirement
windows have also been an important vehicle to help implement workforce reductions.
Particularly in larger businesses, DB plans have been quite successful in encouraginj early'
retirement on a temporary (or an ongoing) basis through subsidized early retirement
provisions, and through early retirement windows (Fields and Mitchell, 1984). Though recent
legislation and regulations have restricted the choices once available for early retirement
windows, DB plans remain an important tool in human resources management Many plan
sponsors favor the DB plan because their goal is to pay benefits to those who stay until
retirement DC plans, though they offer less opportunity to influence mobility, will probably
also grow in importance, particularly if Congress were to undertake a meaningful pension
simplification effort Investments of DC plan assets are likely to change. Falling interest
rates, as well as the solvency problems and negative publicity about insurance companies,
may encourage covered workers to shift into stocks and move out of the lower-return
"guaranteed" assets offered by financial intermediaries.
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"In many ways, the pension environment during the 1980s became more segmented
and less stable than in the past. As the business environment grows more competitive, large
employers that remain economically viable will probably retain their commitment to career
employment, offering DB plans as well as retiree health coverage to both hourly and salaried
employees. (Many of these companies often also provide a supplementary DC plan, more
often for salaried employees.) These larger businesses have historically espoused a co1:pOrate
culture emphasizing responsibility for employee security. larger employers will probably
continue to foster pension plans, and partiaJlarly DB plans, as part of their drive toward
"quality manaBement" and the resulting human resource policies. In some cases, nonqualifieq
supplemental plans are likely to grow in importance as regulations restrict what can be done
overall. Se~ these nonqualified benefit promises should also grow in importance.
In contrast, small businesses have found it increasingly diffiaJlt to provide high wages
and generous benefits, particularly in light of increasingly complex legal and accounting rules,
resulting in rising pension aI1rnini"trative costs (Hay Huggins, 1990; Mitchell and Andrews,
1981). Unless pension law is significantly simplified so that ailrnini"trative costs are radically
reduced, small companies cannot adopt DB plans. Similarly, companies facing frequent
ownership changes are less likely to be stable and may not have human resources policies
favoring career employment. Smaller companies are less likely to demand and reward career
employment so that pensions are less likely to be offered, and when they are offered, they
will be more likely to be DC plans. Looking to the future, the great unknown is how strong'
large businesses will be, and how strong the traditionally unionized manufacturing component
will be relative to the total American economy.
Corporate bankruptcies, buyouts and downsi7.inghave also cut short career jobs for
many long-term employees who often lose the opportunity to receive retirement benefits
based on a full career at one firm. When businessesare bought and sold, they sometimes ",
develop stable human resources policies which include pensions, but in many cases,
employment arrangements become less stable. On balance, benefit coverage is sure to fall as
a result of bankruptcy. For private sector pensions, this loss will primarily be in the form of
future a.c.cr~alssince plan assets tend to cover most accrued benefits, and
government-provided pension insurance under the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
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(pBGC) selVes as an additional safety net. (Whether the PBGC's current financial problems
will necessitate an additional infusion of funds to remain viable js beyond the scope of our
paper, but see Ippolito, 1989.) AdditionaIly, more businesses are relying on conting~nt
workers who are unlikely to have benefits of any type, but particularly pensions. Growth in
short-term employment and contingent workers will probably reduce both DB and DC plan
coverage.
In the public sector, there js more rjsk of benefit loss when state and local
government budget needs cannot be met by tax revenues. There js no pension termination
insurance in the public sector akin to that offered by the PBGC for private sector pension
.
plans, and plans appear rather less-well funded than in the private sector (Mitchell and
Smith, forthcoming 1992). As a consequence, public workers' pension accruals could be
threatened, as well as future benefit accruals, cost-of-living provisions, and retiree health
coverage. More oversight and reporting in the public pension arena would vastly benefit
both covered pensioners and taxpayers, and would increase economic security of those in the
public pension plan business.
Pensions and the Public Policy Environment
During the last decade, new pension legislation was enacted seven times so that
requirements seemed to change constantly. This vast body of pension law and regulation
radically altered the pension environment and some of the results of thjs movement are still
unfolding. Major changes in pension law were incorporated in 1RA with key provisions
effective on January 1, 1989. As indicated above, there remain questions and uncertainties
about major portions of the regulations under thjs legislation, and effective dates were
delayed again in February 1992. While the authorities are revisiting the regulations, 1RA
remains in effect, and employers are required to meet a standard of good faith compliance.
Therefore, many legal pension questions remain open at present, and a large number of
plans await revisions.
It is lrighly likely that pension law and regulation will continue to evolve in the next
several years. What will happen to tax rates in the future js not known, but as of early 1992,
there remain two conflicting forces confronting both Congress and the Bush Ailmini!\tration.
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~On the one hand, there is a great desire to lower taxes, but on the other hand, there remains
a great need to raise revenue. 1bree primaIy types of income on which taxes are not
currently paid include pensions, other employee benefits, and interest on home mortgage
loans. There is great temptation to tax these items, since doing so would raise revenue
without increasing tax rates.
Tax preferences for pensions have already been challenged several times over the last
decade, as Congress has imposed penalties on early distributions and termination reversions,
increased taxes on lump-sum cash distributions from pension plans, and reduced the limits on
tax-preferred contributions to, and benefits payable, from both DB and DC plans. There
have aho been proposals to tax part of pension investment earnings. Marginal changes in
the tax status of pensions may not dramatically change overall coverage rates, but if
Congress were to repeal entirely the pension tax preference, this would probably curtail
growth and cause more plan sponsors to freeze or terminate their plans (Zeisler and
Rappaport, forthcoming 1992). Available economic evidence suggests that increasing taxes
on pension contributions and/or investment earnings will reduce pensions' appeal, though the
exact size of the pension response to tax changes has yet to be precisely measured
(Woodbury and Huang, 1991). In any event, if Congress pursues a narrow policy focus on
taxes foregone, this will certainly deter the development of sound pension regulation and
thoughtful consideration of pension issues within a larger retirement income security policy.
Other forms of government regulation have a1so played an important role in shaping
the pension environment New pension legislation appeared almost annually over the last
decade, and delays in releasing inteIpretative reiWations have made the pension
environment extremely difficult for plan sponsors (for a Sl1mmaryof recent pension
regulation see EBRI, 1990). Over at least the last six years, employers seeking to comply
with the rules, and small companies contemplating new plans, have been faced with a
chaotic regulatory environment which makes it costly and complex to offer tax qualified
plans. Some employers cannot absorb or o~t these costs readily (through lowering wages
or other benefits), particularly in smaller operations.
Policymakers have been somewhat sympathetic to these developments, and have
begun to design so-called "pension simplification proposals", particularly for smaller
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employers. For example, the Bush Administration recently proposed relaxing
nondiscrimination rules for sma1l employers who offered a DC pIan with specific design
features. While some hailed this as a movement in the right direction, others expressed
concern that it tended to disfavor DB plans, and might possibly reduce coverage for
lower-paid workers. Additional concerns expressed included worries that the proposals
themselves did not go far enough in the simplification direction. Unfortunately, conflicts
have developed in the last decade between the ostensible goa1s and the results of pension
legislation, producing a great deal of skepticism about the possIble outcomes of further
legislation. Taxation and regulation remain key areas of uncertainty; here is where
policymakers can help determine whether employer-sponsored pensions grow, or wither.
These regulatory burdens on employer-sponsored benefits are exacerbated by
powerful pressures on other components of the retirement income system. Private savings
rates are th~ lowest they have been in years, and many believe that Americans are not saving
enough to ensure retirement-age well-being (Bernheim, 1991). Government retirement
programs such as Social Security and Medicare will certainly become more financi.ally
troubled as the baby boom group matures (Aaron, 1982). In response, these government
programs have been reformed in ways which may place employer-sponsored pensions under
increasing stress. For instance, Social Security benefits were cut and the normal retirement
age raised in 1983; similar reforms may have to be revisited if demand for benefits continues
to be high. Payroll taxes for Medicare and Social Security have also been increased almost
annually in the last decade. In addition, many foresee passage of some type of national
health insurance plan. H all employers are required to offer some minimum health care
coverage, this will exert severe cost pressures on employers not currently offering these
benefits (Mitchell, 1991). Since most of these are sma1ler employers who can ill afford to
pay increased labor costs, the health care mandate might further reduce pension coverage
offered by smaller employers. Each of these policy concerns highlights the fact that
employer-prov:ided pensions are only one leg of the "three-legged retirement income stool",
and that public policy in the retirement income area broadly speaking will influence both
employers' willingness to offer pensions, and workers' demand for pensions in years to come.
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-Implications For Pension Coverage, Plan Type and
Plan Design
Retirement income security for the baby boom generation remains a goal, but not a
certainty in the United States. 1\\'0 legs of the traditional three-legged stool are weak, and in
this essay we show that grave problems have also undermined the third leg,
employer-sponsored pensions.
Major structural changes in employer-sponsored pension plan design and coverage
occurred over the last decade, largely in response to a cb~nging business structure, different
employee demands, the financial problems of plan sponsors, and a dynamic public policy
environment. Overall, these changes did not increase American workers' retirement income
security, and it is critically important that policymakers seek ways to create a more positive
retirement future. These same forces affect both pensions and retiree medical benefits.
Pension Plan Coverage and Plan Type
Several forces at work today point to further decline in pensions and, particularly, DB
coverage for the average employee, though it is possible that DC coverage will stabilize or
even increase slightly. The most important factors depressing pension plan coverage overall,
and DB coverage in particular, include:
. Lower real pay levels and lower marginal tax rates.
More competitive labor and product markets, causing buyouts and downsizing.
Reduced profits, pay, worker-firm attachments, unionization, and firm size.
Increased administrative costs and complexity due to pension regulation on top
of which rising health care costs are superimposed.
Extensive and complex pension regulation, including nondiscrimination
requirements, premiums charged for pension insurance, and fees reduce
employers' ability to offer pension plans.
.
.
On the other hand, we have also identified several factors which will somewhat offset
the prevailing trend to lower coverage by tax-qualified employer-sponsored pension plans.
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The factors supporting pension growth include:
. The aging of the workforcewhich willprobably heighten awareness of
retirement income needs.
. Increasing desires to retire early which raise the need for pension income.
The continufug appeal of pensions as tax-preferred savings vehicles, combined
with higher family income taxes among dual-eamer couples.
Employers' need to provide retirement benefits which reduce turnover for
younger employees while increasing retirement rates among older workers.
Increasing concerns about the long-term level of Social Security and Medicare
benefits.
.
.
.
If Congress wishes to enhance the chances that employer-sponsored pensions survive
this time of transition, policymakers can take several steps. It is imperative to recognize that
company pensions can continue to pl~ an important role in workers' retirement income
security only if there is a more supportive poli~ climate regarding retirement income policy
as a whole. linked with this is the recognition that the labor market and the economy of the
next 20 years will differ from that which we have become accustomed to. Jobs are located in
new regions and industrial sectors, competition is now global, and cost pressures are
everywhere. This implies that labor market policies will change as compared to the past
Retirement age polic;yat the national level will probably also have to chan&e. since
early retirement trends experienced up until recently cannot persist, given the slow growth in
economic productivity. American workers will probably need to be encouraged to save more
for their own retirement, which suggests that pensions should benefit from government
encouragement in the decades to come.
It is also essential for policymakers to recognize that both DB and DC plans have an
important role to play so that regulation should not overtly advantage one form of pension
versus another. American employers and employees are quite diverse. and require different
solutions for different problems. linked to this is our view that pension nondiscrimination
requirements are too complex at present Employers seeking to make employees secure in
retirement are probably overly regulated so as to pro1n'bit a small minority of employers from
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benefiting a limited group of employees. A more rational, stable and coherent retirement
income policy is needed, and pension legislation should fit into this policy rather than being
formulated in terms of deficit reduction needs.
Finally, though a full consideration of the public sectors is beyond the scope of this
paper, Congress and taxpayers should confront the fact that public sector pension plan" are
not especially healthy. and should be considered in a systematic overview of pension
legislation and reform.
Expected Changes in Pension Plan Design
A variety of important changes in pension plan design may be anticipated,
extrapolating from trends over the last ten years. Both employers and employees have
devoted increasing emphasis to pension choice and individual responsibility in benefit plans,
as is evident from the rapid growth of supplemental savings plans, mainly 401(k) plans and
tax-sheltered annuities. Use of matched savin~ plans and other DC plans giving workers
investment choices are also likely to increase.
Nevertheless, from a policy perspective, Americans have very poor overall records as
savers, and it seems dangerous to rely too heavily on individual savings as a source of
retirement benefits. The distribution of risk between employer, employee and the public
sector is an important issue in retirement savings plans and policy. H DC plans permit more
employee savings and expanded employee investment choice, employers will certainly find it
necessary to take a more active role in educating employees about savings and investment
choice. DB plans do not permit covered workers to exercise choice over investment options,
though participants potentially face a different type of risk - that of plan underfunding.
Pension insurance is the scope of this paper, and is the subject of other analysts contributing
to this conference. Nevertheless, it must be kept in mind that allocation of risk remains a
central concern in future discussions of retirement security.
A related point pertains to the form in which benefits are paid DB plans have
traditionally offered benefits in the form of annuities (except for small benefit amounts,
generally less than $3,500 which are often paid out as a lump sum). In contrast, the
conventional DC plan traditionally paid out a cash Jump sum" although it was common to
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offer an annuity option. Lump sums were favorably taxed in the past and still are today, but
to a lesser extent than previously. There is also pressure on some DB plan sponsors to offer
lump sums. This area is a controversial one at present, and Congress may place limitations
on the availability of lump sums, and/or require that they be rolled over into other pension
funds.
In addition to these changes, we see other plan design innovations developing out of
recent experience. Plan sponsors will probably seek innovative plan designs. as long as
regulations do not make it too difficult to implement them. For instance, the cash balance
plans mentioned earlier are likely to increase in favor because they offer many of the
advantages of DB plans, while also offering some features and advantages common to DC
plans.
Compliance with layers of regulations over the years has led to ever more complex
plans, and many such plans now have multiple layers of benefit formulas with different rules
applying to seMce accrued at different points in time. We expect that this increased
complexity will cause employers to place increasing weight on simpler plan desi~ in the
future. The changing business environment will increase emphasis on plans which link
company profitability and benefits provided The number of plans integrated with Social
Security will probably continue to grow if trends shown in Table 8 continue. However, 1RA
has materially changed the rules and attractiveness of integration so that we might also see a
reversal of this trend TRA rules have also forced a decrease in the degree of integration
within integrated plans.
There are opposing views about whether pension plan benefits will become more or
less generous over time. On one hand, benefit levels may have to be reduced somewhat and
early retirement ages raised, if employers are to be able to offer retiree health insurance to
better manage phased retirement and early retirement window plans, and to design plans
which better match retirees' income needs. On the other hand, a review of DB plan design
trends over the 1980s suggests that subsidization of early retirement trends remains the norm..
and indeed has become more prevalent over time. As the workforce continues to age, some
workers and employers will rely on pensions to enhance the appeal of retirement
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There remain important unanswered questions about how nondiscrimination
reqpirements will affect benefits offered to different groups of employees. Many of these
nondiscrimination issues are not yet fully resolved, yet there is reason to expect that
companies will begin to ns lidate 1 h ur d arie w rk . Because of
continued declines in collective bargaining coverage, we predict continued decline of multi-
emplQyer phm", On the other hand, there will be continued growth in nonqpalifieq
supplemental plan", There may be some overall reduction in benefit levels as manaeement
finds it can benefit less from qualified plans than in the past.
Policy Issues
Without going into extensive detail, it is important to review a few of the most
important policy proposals that have been the subject of intense debate in recent years to see
how their passage might change the pension environment in years to come.
Great strides have been made in improving workers' chances of vesting, first under
ERISA, and then subsequently by reducing vesting requirements to 5 years of service. This
has probably improved pension participation since many Americans change jobs repeatedly
during their worklives. Despite this, some analysts contend that increased pension portability
should remain an important policy goal so that workers who change jobs or spend part of
their careers out of the workplace, will benefit from increased retirement income. On the
other hand, many recognize that limiting access to retirement funds is necessary by requiring
rollover into another retirement vehicle, so that workers are not tempted to spend lump sum
amounts that should be saved for retirement. Thus, DC plans are seen as meeting
portability needs, primarily because they can pay benefits in the form of lump sums when a
worker changes employers. However, when benefits are spent rather than ~ved, they cease
to be available as retirement benefits. Requiring more h'beral pension portability would
undermine some of the good reasons employers offer pensions - namely to reduce turnover
and to regulate retirement flows - and would probably not encourage pension growth
overall. If Congress limits the availability of lump sums with requirements that they be
rolled over, this could benefit many, though some are concerned that too much labor force
immobility might be detrimental.
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Another policy concern alluded to above is the continuing issue of ~
related to retirement and how they should be divided between active workers, retirees,
employers and the government For example, many retirees currently bear virtually all the
risk of non-Medicare retiree health care costs, while the federal government bears much DB
plan termination risk (Bodie, 1992). Restructuring the retiree health, or the DB pension
promise and its insurance system, would dramatically alter employers' and employees'
willingness to keep plans, or to start new plans. DC plans offer yet a different pattern of
risk-sharing, depending on their specific structures; for example, in a common money-
purchase plan, the worker bears diversified capital market risk, while in a profit-sharing or
stock-ownership plan, the risks are much more concentrated (Blasi and Kruse, 1991.) The
worker bears the full inflation risk with all DC plans, although in some plans this can be
partially offset by the type of investments chosen. Understanding how these risks differ
across benefit plans, and how they relate to company profitability as well as the overall
economic environment, deserves much more attention in years to come.
Stepping back and viewing pensions from a broader perspective, there remains the
ultimate public policy question of whose responsibility should retirement saving be, and what
role should pensions play in achieving the savings targets? Over the years, many have urged
increased private saving, but the efforts have not worked: personal savings as a percentage
of personal income dropped between 1970 and 1990. This trend is even more alarming when
considered in combination with pressures on long-term government and business spending for
retirement The savings debate will have to be paired with a national debate over the
socially optimal retirement age, as the workforce continues to grow older and more diverse,
and as pressures grow stronger on the Social Security and medical care systems. We believe
that public policy should preserve a central role for pensions in the decades ahead, and both
DB and DC pension plans should be available in service to a diverse business and labor
community. On the other hand it must be recognized that pensions have many important
functions beyond their retirement savings role. Increasingly burdensome restrictions and the
frequency of change in those restrictions on pensions are threatening the multi-dimensional
benefits that pensions offer to employees, the sponsoring employers and the economy as a
whole.
33
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Aaron, Henry. Economic Effects of Social Security. Washington, D.C.: Brook:ings 1982.
Allen, Steven G., Cark, Robert L and McDermed, Ann A. "PensionBonding and lifetime
Jobs." National Bureau of Economk Re.search Worldng Paper 3688. April 1991.
Andrews, Emily. The Changing Profile of Pensions in America. Washington, D.C.: Employee
Benefit Research Institute, 1985.
Andrews, Emily. Pension Policy and SmaIl Employers: At What Price Coverage? Washington,
D.C.: Employee Benefit Research Institute, 1989.
Beller, Daniel J. and Lawrence, Helen H. 'Trends in Private Pension Coverage." Trends in
Pensions: 1992. Eds: John Turner and Daniel J. Beller. Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office. Forthcoming (1992).
Belous, RS. "Flexible Employments: The Employer's Point of View." In Bridges to
RetiremenJ. Ed: Peter Doeringer. Ithaca, NY: fiR Press, 1990.
Bernheim, B. Douglas. The Vanishing Nest Egg. New York: Priority Press Publications for
The Twentieth Century Fund, 1991.
Biggs, John H. "Implications of Demographic Changes for the Design of Retirement
Programs." Pension Research CoundJ, Working Paper Series 91-5. Forthcoming (1992).
Blas~ Joseph and Kruse, Douglas. The New Owners. New York: Harper Business, 1991.
Bodie, Zvi. "Pensions as Retirement Income Insurance." Journal of Economic Literature.
March 1990,28(1), pp. 2849.
34
Bodie, Zvi. "Federal Pension Insurance: Is it the S&L Crisis of the 1990's?" Paper presented
at the Industrial Relations &search Association meetings, New Orleans, January, 1992.
Brown, Charles and Medoff, James. 'The Employer Size-Wage Effect." JoumoJ of Political
Economy. October 1989,97(5), pp. 1027-1059.
"Big Employers Retain Defined Benefit Plans." Business Insurance. November 18, 1991.
OsrIc, Robert L and McDermed, Ann A The Choice of Pension Plans in a Changing
Regulatory Envirorunent Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute 1990.
Congressional Budget Office. Tax Policyfor Pensions and Other R.etiremenJStzvin&s.
Washington, DC: u.s. Government Printing Office, April 1987.
Ehrenberg, Ronald and Jakubson, George. Advance Notice Provisions in Plant Closing
Legislation. Kalamazoo, MI: Upjohn, 1988.
Employee Benefit Research Institute. 'Databook on Employee Benefits." Washington, D.c.,
1990.
Employee Benefit Research Institute. "New Evidence That Employees Choose Conservative
Investments for Their Retirement Funds." EBRI Notes. February 1992.
Employee Benefit Research Institute. "Questions and Answers on Employee Benefit Issues."
EBRI Issue Briefs. October 1991.
Employee Benefit Research Institute. 'Types of Pension Plans and Their Assets." EBRI
Issue Briefs. April 1990.
35
Fields, Gary and Mitchell, Olivia S. RetiremenJ, Pensions and Social Security. Cambridge,
MA; MIT Press, 1984.
Grant, Paul B. 'The Open Window - Special Early Retirement Plans in Transition."
Employee BenejiJs JoU17lll1. March 1991.
Greenwich Associates. "Going Global, Good Going." Greenwich Associates Reports.
Greenwich, cr, 1991.
Gustman, Alan and Mitchell, Olivia S. "Pensions and the Labor Market Behavior and Data
Requirements." Pensions and the u.s. Economy: The Need for Good Data. Eds:
Bodie, Zvi and Munnell, Alicia. Philadelphia, PA: Pension Research Council.
Forthcoming (1992).
Gustman, Alan, Mitchell, Olivia S., and Steinmeier, Thomas. 'The Role of Pensions in the
Labor Market." ComelI UniversityDepartmenJ of Labor Economics Working Paper.
Forthcoming (1992).
Gustman, Alan and Steinmeier, Thomas. "Pensions, Efficiency Wages and Job Mobility."
National Bureau of Economic Resemr:h Working Paper 2426. November 1987.
Hay-Huggins Company, Inc. Pension Plan Expense Study for the Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation. September 1990.
Ippolito, Richard A "Selecting Out High Discounters: A Theory of Defined Contn"bution
Pensions." Working paper. Forthcoming (1992).
Ippolito, Richard A "Pensions, Economics and Public Policy." Pension Research Coundl.
Homewood, IL: Dow Jones-Irwin, 1986.
36
Ippolito, Richard A "The Economics ofPension Insurance." Pension Research CounciL
Homewood, II..: Dow Jones-IIWin, 1989.
Ippolito, Richard A "An Economic Appraisal of Pension Tax Policy." Pension Research
CounciL Homewood, II..: Dow Jones-IIWin, 1990.
KotIikoff, Lawrence and Smith, DanieL Pensions in the American Economy. Chicago, IL:
University of Chicago Press, 1983.
T~7.e.ar,Edward P. "Pensions as Severence Pay." Finondal Aspects of the United States
Pension System. Eds: Bodie, Zvi and ShoveD, John. Chicago: National Bureau of
Economic Research The University of Chicago Press, 1983.
Levine, Philip and Mitchell, Olivia S. "The Baby Boom's Legacy: Relative Wages in the
Twenty-first CentuIy." .American Economic Review 78, May 1988.
Lumsdaine, Robin; Stock, James and Wise, David 'Three Models of Retirement
Computational ComplexityVerses Predictive Validity." NaJionalBureau of Economic
Research,WorkingPaper3558. December 1990.
Lumsdaine, Robin; Stock, James and Wise, David. "Efficient Windows and Labor Force
Reduction." Journal of Publk: Economics, 43. November 1990.
Luzadis, Rebecca A and Mitchell, Olivia S. "Explaining Pension Dynamics." Journal of
Hwnan Resources. Fa111991,26(4).
"Are Defined Benefit Plans Dead?" Mercer Bulletin. August 1991, No. 194.
Mitchell, Olivia S., ed. "As the Workforce Ages." Ithaca, NY: ILR Press. Forthcoming
(1992).
37.
"
Mitchell, Olivia S. "The Effects of MandatOI}' Benefit Packages." Research in Labor
Economics. Eds: L Bassi, D. Crawford and R Ehrenberg. Greenwich, Cf: JAI Press,
1991, pp. 297-32JJ.
Mitchell, Olivia S. "Fringe Benefits and Labor Mobility." Journal of Human Resourr:es.
Spring 1982, 17(2), pp. 286-298.
Mitchell, Olivia S. 'Trends in Retirement Provisions." Trends in Pensions: 1992. Eds: J.
Turner and D. Beller. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.
Forthcoming (1992).
Mitchell, Olivia S. "Worker Knowledge of Pension Provisions." Journal of Labor Economics.
January 1988, 6(1), pp. 28-39.
Mitchell, Olivia S. and Andrews, Emily. "Scale Economies in Private Multi-Employer
Pension Systems." Industrial and Labor Relations Review. July 1981, 34(4), pp.
522-530.
Mitchell, Olivia S. and Smith, Robert S. "Public Sector Pensions: Benefits, Funding and
Unionization. n Industrial Relations Research Association Papers and Proceedings.
Madison, WI. Forthcoming (1992).
Munnell, Alicia R "It's Time To Tax Employee Benefits." New England Economic Review.
July/August 1989.
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation. "Creating a Sound Insurance Program." 1990
.Annual Report. Washington D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991.
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation. Pension Plan Cost Study. Washington D.C: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1990.
38
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation. Pension Plan Choice. Washington D.C: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1990.
Piascentini, Joseph. "An Analysis of Pension Participation at Current and Prior Jobs, Receipt
and Use of Preretirement lump-Sum Distributions, and Tenure at Current Job."
Employee BenefiJ Research Institute Report to the Us. Department of Labor. May 1990.
Quinn, Joseph F., Burkhauser, Richard V. and Myers, Daniel A Passing the Torch: The
Influence of Economic Incentives on Work and Retirement. Ka1~m~700: W.E. Upjohn
Institute, 1990.
Rappaport, Anna. "Retirement Benefit Structure in the 1990s -Defined Benefit vs. Defined
Contribution Plan Structure." IACA, Forthcoming (1992).
Rappaport, Anna. 'Defined Contribution Plans: Do They Offer a Solution to Retiree
Medica1liabiIity Problems?" PostemploymenJBenefiJs. Winter 1991,8(1).
Rappaport, Anna. "The Future of Employee Benefit-Related Public Policy." Employee
Benefits Journd September 1989, 14(3).
Rappaport, Anna. "New Ideas in Employee Benefits Planning." Journal of Pension Planning
and Compliance. Spring 1987, 12(1).
Rappaport, Anna. "Human Resources Implicationsof a Cb~n~nf Labor Force." Benefits
Quarterly. Second Quarter 1988,IV(2).
Rappaport, Anna. "The Role of the Actua.Iy in Defining Public Policy Implications of an
Aging Society." IAA Congress. Forthcoming (1992).
39
Rappaport, Anna and Schieber. Sylvester. Discussion of Biggs Paper "Demography and
Retirement The Twenty-First Century." Pension Research Council ~ of 1991
Conference. Forthcoming (1992).
Rosenbloom, Jerry S. and :fI~11m~tl,G. Victor. Employee Benefit Planning. Third Edition.
Englewood Cliffs, N.H.: Prentice Hall, 1991.
Spencer, Charles D. and Associates. Spencer's Research Report on Employee Benefits. June
22, 1990.
Society of Actuaries. "Plan Design for the Next Decade." Record. October 1990, 16(4B), p.
2779.
Turner, John and Beller, Daniel, eds. Trends in Pensions: 1989. Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1990.
U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. Employee Benefits in Medium and
Large Finns. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989.
U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. Employee Benefits in SmaIl Finns.
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990.
U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. Employee Benefits in State and Local
GovemmenJs. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987.
U.S. Government Accounting Office. Pension Plans: Terminations, Asset Reversions and
ReplacemenJs Following Leveraged Buyouts. U.S. Government Printing Office,
GAOfHRD 91-21, 1991.
40
u.s. Government Accounting Office. States Need Labor's Help in Regulating Multiple
Employer Welfare Arrangements. U.S. Government Printing Office, USGAOHRD
92-40, March 1992.
U.S. President. Economic Report of the PresidenJ1990. Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1990.
Woodbury, Stephen A and Huang, Wei-Jang. The Tar TreatmenJ of Fringe Beneji1s.
Kal~m~700, MI: The Upjobn Institute, 1991
Zeisler, Paul and Rappaport, Anna. "PublicPolicy and Pension Plan Taxation: The
Implication for Plan Design and for Participants." JoU171fl1of Pension Planning and
Compliance. Forthcoming (Spring 1992).
.
.
41
--From 1989 Survey of Medillll and large FiJ'8S-- --Froll 1990 Survey of SIIIIU Fi J'8S--
Prof. Tech. Prod. Prof. Tech. Prod.
All and and end All end end end
Employees ~Clerical ~E8Ployees ~Clerical Service
All ret i raent 81% 85% 81% 80% 42% 49% 47% 37%
Defined benefit pension 63% 64% 63% 63% 20% 20% 23% 18%
Wholly employer financed 60% 61% 61% 60% 19% 18% 21% 18%
Partly employer financed 3% 3% 2% 2% 1% 2% 1% 1%
Defined contribution 48% 59% 52% 40% 31% 40% 36% 24%
Uses of funds
Retirement 36% 43% 39% 31% 28% 36% 32% 21%
Wholly employer financed 14% 15% 14% 12% 16% 19% 17% 15%
Partly employer financed 22% 28% 24% 18% 11% 17% 16% 6%
Capital accumulation 14% 18% 14% 11% 4% 5% 4% 2%
Wholly employer financed 2% 1% 1% 3% 1% 2% 2% 1%
Partly employer financed 12% 17% 13% 8% 2% 3% 3% 2%
Types of plans
Savings and thrift 30% 41% 35% 21% 10% 16% 15% 5%
Deferred profit sharing 15% 13% 13% 16% 15% 17% 17% 13%
Employee stock ownership 3% 4% 3% 3% 1% 1% 1% _.
Money purpose pension 5% 8% 6% 3% 6% 9% 6% 6%
Sources: U.S. Department of Labor, Employee Benefits in Mediumand large Firas, 1989, June, 1990,
Bulletin 2363, Table 1
U.S. Department of Labor, Employee Benefits in S..II Firas, 1990, September, 1991,
Bulletin 2388, Table 1
.. Less than .5%
Table 1
Percentage of Employees Participating In Private Sector Retirement Plans
(1989 and 1990)
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Up loyees of State and Local Governllents - 1987
Medin and Saall All Regular Po Ii ce and
Large Finis Fi MIS EIIployees E.ployees Teachers Firefiahters
AII ret i rellent 81% 42% sa 17% 19% t8%
Defined benefit penston 63% 20% 13% 12% 1St 13%
Wholly employer ftnanced 60% 19% 20% 22% 17% 17%
Partly employer ftnanced 3% 1% 73% 70% 78% 76%
Defined contribution 48% 31% 1% 1% 8% 13%
Uses of funds
Retirement 36% m 1% 1% 8% 12%
Wholly employer financed 14% 16% 4% 4% St 4%
Partly employer financed 22% 11% 4% St 3% 8%
Capital accu.ulatton 14% 4%
Wholly employer financed 2% 1%
Partly e.ployer financed 12% 2%
Types of plans
Savings and thrift 30% 10%
Deferred profit shartng 1St 1St
Employee stock ownership 3% 1%
Money purpose penston St 6%
Table 2
Percentage of Employees Participating In Public Employer Retirement Plans
Compared to Private Sector Participation
Sources: u.s. Department of Labor, Employee Beneftts in Medtn and Large Finis, 1989, June, 1990,
Bulletin 2363, Table 1
u.s. Department of Labor, Employee Benefits in Saall FtMlS, 1990, September, 1991,
Bulletin 2388, Table 1
U.s. Department of Labor, EIIployee Benefits in State and Local Governments, 1987, May, 1988,
Bulletin 2309, Table 1
** Less than .St
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Table 3
Patterns In Defined Benefit and Defined Contribution Pension Plans
(1975 . 1989)
1m 1980 1m 1986 1987 1988 mi
~U8berof Plans in Operation (OOOs)
Defined benefit 107 179 224 230 234 leA NA
Defined contribution 233 410 181 617 638 leA NA
Total 140 ssg 805 847 872 leA NA
Percentave of Total
Defined benefit 31.5% 30.4% 27.8% 27.2% 26.8% leA leA
Defined contribution 68.5% li.6% 72.2% 72.8% 73.2% leA NA
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% leA NA
Annual Rate of Increase Fro~ Prior Year
Defined benefit 10.8% 4.6% 2.7% 1.7%
Defined contribution 12.0% 7.2% 6.2% 3.4%
Tota I
HU8ber of private aulti-eaployer plans (ODDs)
Defined benefit 2.1 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.1 NA
Defined contribution 0.3 0.4 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.2 NA
Total 2.4 2.7 3.1 3.1 3.2 3.3 NA
Favorable Dete~ination letter Applications Issued by IRS (ODDs)
Hote: 1987 includes three quarters only
Initial Applications
Defined benefit NA 19 17 22 16 17 5
Defined contribution NA 50 30 45 40 46 23
Tota! 69 47 67 56 63 28
Te~ination Applications
Defined benefit NA 4 12 11 11 12 16
Defined contribution NA 9 14 15 13 13 13
Total 13 26 26 24 25 29
Initial Applications as a Percentage of Existing Plans
"Defined benefit 10.6% 7.6% i.6% 6.8% NA NA
Defined contribution 12.2% 5.2% 7.3% 6.3% leA NA
Tota I 11.7% 5.8% 7.ft 6.4% leA NA
Teraination Applications as a Percentaqe of Existing Plans
Defined benefit 2.2% 5.4% 4.8% 4.7% NA NA
Defined contribution 2.2% 2.4% 2.4% 2.0% NA NA
Total 2.2% 3.2% 3.1% 2.8% NA NA
Sources: 1990 ESRI Detebook on Employee Benefits, page 79
EBRI Issue Brief, October 1991, pege 8 (multi-employer plan date only)
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Plan Feature Defined Benefit Defined Contribution
Benefit accrual pattern Nigher ill tater ,..rs Nigher in earUer years
Cashouts for early leayers IIot uluaU y Lap sa
Retirnent benefit P8Y8!nt Annuity until death Lap sa
tarly retire8ent subsidy possible Yes IIot usua tty
Postretireaent benefit increases Often IIot .sualty
Investltent risk Borne by 88Ployer Borne by nployer
Benefits fully funded No Yes
PSGCbenefit guarantee Yes No
[aployee .akes asset
allocation decision No Ves
Table 4
Major Differences Between Defined Benefit and
Defined Contrfbution Pension Plans
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(for period endin~ Oeceaber 31. 1989) 1..!U! L!m Um:
AU
.
tans 10." 14.- 16.7.
Single e8ployer defined benefit 10.7" IS." 17.1t
Single eaployer defined contribution 11.- 14.- 16.-
Multi-nployer u.- 11." 14.7"
Consuaer price index 4.7" 4.5% 3.7%
Table 5
Rates of Return by Plan Type
Source: April, 1990 EBRI Issue Brief, ;.ge 6: ElRI Quarterly Pension Investaent Report
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Average
IIu8ber of Nu8ber of
Nu8ber of £lip loyees £lip loyees
!!II: Plans (OOOs) Per Plan
1975 1,601 148 155
1980 5,009 4,048 808
1985 7,402 7.353 193
1986 8,046 7,860 977
1987 8,777 8,860 1009
15188 11,400 9,630 1024
15189 10,230 . 11,530 1127
Source: 15191 Statistical Abstract NU8ber 890
Table 6
Number of Plans and Participants In Employee Stock Ownership Plans
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-Total '18I1S- -By Size of '1811Assets t. 1990--
Jm J!22 .SSOOM S201-SOOM ISO-200M cSSOM
CapallY stock 26.0. 14.ft 26.5% 18.1. 12.c. 31.0.
Other C08OI1 stock 16.c. 1'." 1..1. 17." IO.A' 1'.5%
Ionds I.It t.o. I.ft I.ft 1.1. t.5%
Guaranteed invest8ellt
contracts 41.ft 38.ft 36.6% 43.6% 46.6% 28.0.
Cash and short-ten
securities 6.7% 7.1% 6.5% '.0. '.5% 1.3%
Other 2.8% 2.4% 2.1 1.4% 2.8% 3.7%
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Source: Greenwich Associates (1991). p. 62.
Table 7
Defined Contribution Plan Asset Mix,by Size of Plan
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Twe of Fo1"8Ula 1980 l!§1 1!H 1!U J!§! 1985 .I!H 1988 1989
Vithout tJltet1"8ted
fo.... La 15 57 15 45 44 . 38 38 37
Vttls t lItegrated
fo....l. 45 43 45 15 16 11 12 12 13
lenefit offset by
5S papent- 30 33 15 J5 36 40 43 J9 41
Excess f01"8ula** 16 10 10 ZO ZO 27 24 26 24
Table 8
Integration of Defined Benefit Plans WIth SocIal Security
(1980-89)
. Pension benefit calculated is reduced by a portion of pri..ry Social Security papents.
** Pension f01"8Ula applies lower benefit rete to .arnings subject to Social Security taxes or below a specified dollar
threshold.
NOTE: Data exclude supplelllntal pension plans. SU8s"y ftot equal totals because of rotIftding.
Source: Mitchell (1992 forthcoaing), Table 9.11. Data cover plans in ..diu. and large fir8S only. An E8ployee
Benefits Survey (EBS)for this group was not conducted in 1987. The EBSsa.,ling fra.. changed in 1988to
include smaller fiT'll5 and IIOre industries than before, so data for 1988 and 1989 are ftot precisely coaperable
with previous years' tabulations.
.
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Table 9
Minimum Requirements for Earty Retirement In Defined Benefit Pension Plans
(1980-1989)
'ercent of full-tf- participants
1980
.1m 1982 1983 !!!! 1985 1986 1988 1989
'Ians pel"8ittt... _rlJ
retire8eftt* t8 t8 17 17 17 17 . t8 17
Service require.ents
alone
30 Jears requi red 10 5 5 6 5 4 5 7 6
Age requireaents alone 9 10 9 10 10 9 10 10 6
Age 55 8 9 9 10 9 9 10 10 6
Age and service requireaents
Age 55 and 5 years 3 4 4 3 4 3 3 4 9
Age 55 and 10 years ItA 36 35 35 39 43 41 44 43
Age 55 and 15 years ItA 11 10 9 7 8 7 10 8
Age 60 and 10 years ItA 4 4 5 5 4 4 5 4
Age 62 and 10 years ItA 2
Age plus service SU8 5 9 10 , 10 10 , 4
Sum equals 80 or less ItA ItA tIA 6 6 5 5 2 1
Sum equals 85 or aore 3 6 5 5 5 4 4 1
'Ians not pel"8ittfng early
retire8ellt 2 2 3 3 3 3 2 2 3
. Early retirement as the point when a worker can retire and i-.ediately receive accrued benefits based on service and
earnings; benefits are reduced for years prior to the nOr811 age.
IIOTE: Data exclude supplemental pension plans. Su.s..y not equal totals because of rounding. ItA aeans data not
avai lable, and8__8 aeans less than 0.5 percent.
Source: Mitchell (1992 forthco.ing), Table 9.3. Data cover plans in medium and large fil"8s only. A comparable Employee
Benefits Survey (EBS) was not conducted in 1987. The EBSsampling frame changed in 1988 to include s..ller
firms and aore industries than before, io data for 1988 and 1989 are not precisely comparable with previous
years' tabulations.
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